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This paper examines how the option of a regulated linear input price aﬀects vertical contracting,
where a monopolistic upstream supplier sequentially oﬀers supply contracts to two symmetric
downstream ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that equilibrium contracts vary with production cost and regulated
price level: If the regulated price is not too high, the option allows for price discrimination,
but prevents foreclosure in the intermediary market. Indeed, if both cost and optional price are
rather low, non-discriminatory input prices below cost may arise.
Optional input prices are socially more desirable than a ﬂat ban on price discrimination, as
consumers beneﬁt from more intense downstream competition.
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11 Introduction
When a monopolistic supplier of an essential input sequentially contracts with compet-
ing downstream ﬁrms, it might use price discrimination to monopolise the market or
to engage in rent-shifting among these ﬁrms. As an example, consider electricity and
gas retailing, or service-based competition in telecommunications. Here, the incumbent
network operator might join in opportunism towards service providers when providing
access. To prevent such behaviour, European legislation (Art. 82(c) TEC) and national
regulatory authorities categorically prohibit discriminatory practices of market dominant
ﬁrms. We question whether this approach leads to a socially desired outcome and propose
potential regulation as an alternative.1 Our idea is to curtail the supplier’s ability to price
discriminate by giving downstream ﬁrms the option of claiming a regulated linear input
price. We examine how such a regulatory option aﬀects supply contracts and evaluate its
eﬃciency by comparing it to existent non-discrimination clauses.
There is a considerable literature dealing with opportunism in vertical contracting which
also proposes solutions to the problem: E.g. Hart and Tirole (1990) suggest vertical
integration and O’Brien and Shaﬀer (1992) non-overlapping geographic territories or a
common resale price. These solutions seem rather rigorous compared to our approach of
giving downstream ﬁrms an additional outside option.2 In this regard, our idea is more
similar to Marx and Shaﬀer (2004a) and Fontenay and Gans (2005). But while these look
at alternative tariﬀ options an upstream ﬁrm can oﬀer or choose, we examine an outside
option imposed by regulation. Note that additionally looking at other non-discrimination
rules follows McAfee and Schwartz (1994) and, in particular, O’Brien and Shaﬀer (1994).
Our main insight is that the regulated option achieves higher social welfare than a ﬂat
ban on price discrimination in a dynamic market context, where downstream ﬁrms move
sequentially. It prevents foreclosure, and further, results in lower retail prices than man-
dated uniform pricing, provided that production cost and the regulated price are not too
high. In particular, consumer surplus and welfare increase, even though price discrimina-
tion is permitted.
1 This idea relates to the debate of a more economic approach to Article 82 TEC, see Gual, Hellwig
et alter (2005) and Atkinson and Barnekov (2004).
2 It borrows from experiences of U.S. and Australian telecommunications, see King and Maddock
(1999).
2These results are generated by the external threat of regulation and the sequential struc-
ture, given two-part tariﬀs and imperfect downstream competition: The optional regu-
lated price restricts the supplier’s per-unit price-oﬀers and thus, prevents foreclosure if
it is not too high. By sequentially settling on two-part tariﬀ contracts, the supplier can
extract proﬁts from the downstream industry and enlarge its proﬁt share by manipulating
downstream competition. Combined, these two incentives induce the supplier to either
minimize per-unit input prices and charge a ﬁxed fee only, or to oﬀer the second down-
stream ﬁrm a more favorable contract than its rival. In the latter case, the upstream ﬁrm
exploits the strategic substitutability of input prices. But in principal, outcomes vary
with the elasticity of ﬁnal consumers’ demand.
Also in McAfee and Schwartz (1994) uniform pricing in sequential vertical contracting
may arise. Yet, incentives of their model diﬀer from ours: In their setup, uniform input
prices result from the fear of opportunism, given unobservable contracts. We, instead,
suggest a regulatory outside option combined with contracts in two-part tariﬀs.
In the following, we will illustrate our reasoning in more detail: Section 2 introduces the
basic model. Section 3 studies the equilibrium outcome under constrained price discrimi-
nation. Section 4 analyses the impact of non-discrimination clauses. Section 5 concludes.
All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Model
We consider a vertical market setup with a monopolistic upstream supplier N and two
symmetric downstream ﬁrms S1 and S2. Upstream supplier N produces a good that it
sells to S1 and S2 for subsequent distribution to ﬁnal consumers. N produces at marginal
cost c with 0 < c < 1. S1’s and S2’s marginal cost and all other ﬁxed production cost are
normalised to zero.
The downstream market is characterised by linear inverse demand p(X) = 1 − X with
X = x1 + x2. Downstream ﬁrms compete in quantities. But before becoming active in
this market, each downstream ﬁrm Si has to settle on a supply contract with N. In order
to look at ﬁrms’ incentives to foreclose one of the downstream ﬁrms or to engage in rent
shifting among them, we let contracting take place in sequential order.3 Here, we assume
3 For simultaneous moves, see section 4.
3that S1 is the ﬁrst to negotiate its terms with the supplier. The contract itself speciﬁes a
two-part tariﬀ, i.e. a per-unit price ai and a ﬁxed fee Fi, payable to the upstream supplier
N.4 To abstract from subsidies, we assume ai ≥ 0 and Fi ≥ 0.
Consistent with the market power of an upstream monopolist, we presume take-it-or-
leave-it oﬀers by supplier N. Upon receiving the oﬀer, downstream ﬁrms may claim
the regulatory outside option instead: If Si disagrees with the oﬀer, it can alternatively
claim access at per-unit price aR, which is exogeneously determined by regulation with
aR = c+∆ and 0 ≤ ∆ < 1−c. Thus, the option curtails the upstream ﬁrm’s market power.
The timing of the game is illustrated in Figure 1:
Figure 1: The Timing of the Game
First, supplier N oﬀers ﬁrm S1 a contract (a1,F1) for the purchase of the good. S1 can
accept this take-it-or-leave-it-oﬀer or choose the regulated contract (aR,0) instead. In
the second stage, after an agreement with the ﬁrst downstream ﬁrm has been reached,
the supplier likewise makes an oﬀer (a2,F2) to ﬁrm S2. Also S2 can accept or claim the
regulated contract (aR,0). In the third stage, downstream ﬁrms compete in the product
market: Firms which have left the market earn zero. Firms which have stayed compete
over the amount of service they deliver to ﬁnal consumers and order inputs accordingly.
Contracts are observable as we do not refer to issues arising with asymmetric information.
We determine the subgame perfect equilibria of the game by solving it backwards.
3 Equilibrium in view of optional linear access
If both downstream ﬁrms are active and compete with each other, their proﬁts amount
to
Πi = (p − ai)xi − Fi. (1)
4 Non-linear pricing is a typical feature of supply contracts in network industries.
4for given supply contracts (ai,Fi) with i = 1,2. Each downstream ﬁrm chooses its quantity
xi to maximise (1) subject to inverse demand P = 1−X taking the competitor’s quantity
xj as given. Simultaneously solving the two ﬁrst-order conditions








3(1 − 2ai + aj) (3)
with i,j = 1,2 and i  = j. Hence, the optimal quantity and, therefore, individual down-
stream proﬁts also, are strictly decreasing in the own input price ai, but increasing with
the rival’s price aj. This result is rather obvious since downstream ﬁrms compete in the
same market and their products are perfectly substitutable. Note also that equilibrium
price p∗ > ai which immediately follows from (2).
Supplier N anticipates the outcome in the downstream market when it determines the






ΠN = (a1 − c)x
∗
1 + (a2 − c)x
∗
1 + F1 + F2. (4)
To determine F2, N considers S2’s outside option to claim mandatory supply at per-
unit price aR. In this regard, let us denote downstream ﬁrm i’s sales revenues by πi =
(p − ai)xi. Then, S2 will only accept the contract, if
π2(a1,a2) − F2 ≥ π2(a1,a
R).
This constraint becomes binding when N maximises its proﬁts, so that
F2 = π2(a1,a2) − π2(a1,a
R). (5)
Thus, the supplier cannot entirely shift proﬁts towards itself, but has to concede π2(a1,aR)
to S2.
Before N oﬀers S2 a supply contract, it oﬀers S1 a supply contract. Anticipating (4)




















5subject to the participation constraint
π1(a1,a2( )) − F1 ≥ π1(a
R,a2( )).
Again, the constraint arises due to the regulatory outside option. It is binding, when
supplier N maximises its proﬁts, so that
F1 = π1(a1,a2( )) − π1(a
R,a2( )). (7)
By solving the entire programme we obtain diﬀerent types of equilibrium constellations.
The marginal production cost and mandated wholesale price, i.e. c and ∆(c), determine
equilibrium contracts.5 Let us ﬁrst look at rather low marginal production cost:
Proposition 1. For c ≤ 1/7, there is a ∆I(c) and a ∆II(c) with 0 < ∆I < ∆II such that
supply contracts of ﬁrms i = 1,2 have the following properties:
(i) If ∆ ≤ ∆I, then supply contracts are non-discriminatory with a1 = a2 = 0 and
F1 = F2 > 0.
(ii) If ∆I < ∆ ≤ ∆II, then supply contracts are discriminatory and S2 obtains the more
favorable contract, s.t. a1 > a2 and F1 < F2.
(iii) If ∆ > ∆II, the supplier excludes one of the downstream ﬁrms. The active down-
stream ﬁrm’s supply contract is given by am
i = c and F m
i = πi (am




Figure 1 illustrates how production cost and regulated markup combine to induce
the diﬀerent types of equilibrium supply contracts for c ≤ 1/7. For parameter values c
and ∆ that lie in region I, both production cost and the regulated price are small and
supplier N maximises its proﬁts by raising downstream ﬁrms’ proﬁts. For this reason, it
charges a ﬁxed fee only while setting the minimum per-unit price of zero: This lowers the
retail price, raises rather elastic consumers’ demand and, ultimately, leads to higher retail
proﬁts. The supplier here gains more from its share of these proﬁts than it directly looses
in the upstream market from the low per-unit price, which is, indeed, below cost. The
supplier’s proﬁt considerations change for parameter values which lie in region II. Here,
the strategic interdependency of input prices eﬀectively leads to price discrimination:
Decreasing ai still raises Si’s sales revenues, but with ∂2πi/∂ai∂aj, i.e. strategic
5 To characterise the diﬀerent constellations, we deﬁne thresholds ∆I and ∆II, explicit expressions
are given in the Appendix.
6Figure 2: Equilibrium Types with respect to c and ∆ for c ≤ 1/7
substitutability of input prices, they increase more the higher the rival’s price aj for
i,j = 1,2 and i  = j. Actual outcomes are then dependent on the level of c and ∆ as these
deﬁne how much the supplier directly foregoes in the upstream market by lower input
prices.
Finally, in region III, the upstream supplier monopolises the market by excluding one
of the downstream ﬁrms. This maximises the supplier’s proﬁts and can be implemented
because the regulatory outside options seizes to curtail the monopolist’s market power.
Next, let us consider equilibrium constellations in case of relatively high marginal pro-
duction cost. Proposition 2 describes the results:
Proposition 2. For c > 1/7, there is a ∆II(c) > 0 such that supply contracts of ﬁrms
i = 1,2 have the following properties:
(i) If ∆ ≤ ∆II, then supply contracts are discriminatory and S2 obtains the more
favorable contract, s.t. a1 > a2 and F1 < F2.
(ii) If ∆(c) > ∆II, the supplier excludes one of the downstream ﬁrms. The remaining
supply contract takes the form am
i = c and F m
i = πi (am




Figure 3 illustrates Proposition 2 and shows whether price discrimination or exclusion
occurs for given cost and regulated input price markup:
7Figure 3: Equilibrium Types with respect to c and ∆ for c ≤ 1/7
The borderline between region I and II is deﬁned by ∆ = ∆II. Thus, in region I, where
the regulatory price is not too high, input price discrimination occurs. But in region II
the regulatory price seizes to restrict the upstream supplier’s market power. This leads
to one downstream ﬁrm’s exclusion. In contrast to the previous case, the supplier N
never oﬀers non-discriminatory contracts if c > 1/7. This is so because, at this cost level,
retail proﬁts would be lower and upstream losses higher than with low production cost,
if per-unit prices were set to zero. From Proposition 1 and 2 it immediately follows:
Corollary 1. If ∆(c) ≤ ∆II, the regulatory outside option prevents exclusion.
Note here, that an unconstrained supplier would always exclude one of the downstream
ﬁrms. Hence, equilibrium contracts change with a regulatory outside option if ∆ ≤ ∆II.
4 The social optimum and non-discrimination clauses
In this section we evaluate welfare of optional regulated input prices and its various
ensuing equilibrium constellations. We compare the surplus to the customary practices
of banning price discrimination in principal or obliging a seller to make its best terms
available to all buyers.
84.1 The social optimum
For our speciﬁc setup, welfare reduces to consumers’ utility less production cost. By
comparing welfare for varying ∆ and given c, we ﬁnd:
Proposition 3. For c ≤ 1/7, welfare is maximised if ∆ ≤ ∆I. Otherwise, for c > 1/7,
welfare is maximised if ∆ = 0.
Hence, the socially most desirable situation is aligned with the lowest per-unit input
prices. Here, results diﬀer with varying production cost: If marginal cost are relatively
low, supply contracts comprise zero per-unit prices for the entire range of regulated input
prices as long as ∆ ≤ ∆I. But if cost are rather high, the lowest per-unit prices arise if the
regulatory price option corresponds to marginal cost. In both cases, welfare is maximised
since low input prices induce low prices in the ﬁnal market and, therefore, raise consumer
surplus. Note also that welfare is decreasing in ∆, as higher regulated prices permit
contracts with higher input prices.
4.2 Ban on Price Discrimination
Forbidding discriminatory supply contracts implies uniform pricing at a1 = a2 = a and
F1 = F2 = F. With downstream competition given by (1) to (3), it yields equilibrium
quantitiy x for each downstream ﬁrm. The supplier then maximises its proﬁts by consid-
ering
a = argmax
a ΠN = 2(a − c)x + 2F (8)
subject to
πi(a,a) − F ≥ 0.
Solving the conditions, we obtain
a > c and F = πi(a,a).
Regarding welfare this leads to following conclusion:
Proposition 4. Bannning price discrimination is socially as eﬃcient as monopolising
the market, i.e. W u = W m.
To see the intuition, note that prohibiting price discrimination ex-ante leads to uni-
form wholesale prices above marginal cost: By setting prices above marginal cost, the
supplier achieves to induce a monopolistic outcome in the ﬁnal market. Since social sur-
plus sums up to consumers’ utility less production cost, banning price discrimination or
9a downstream ﬁrm’s exclusion induce the same welfare level. Still, the two situations are
diﬀerent in terms of ﬁrms’ proﬁts: In case of uniform pricing, only the upstream supplier
makes proﬁts, while in case of a regulatory option, both the remaining downstream ﬁrm
and the supplier obtain a proﬁt share.
4.3 Renegotiation to obtain Non-Discriminatory Terms
We follow McAfee and Schwartz (1994) when considering renegotiation on non-discriminatory
terms: We suppose that the upstream ﬁrm is obliged to make its best contract available
to both downstream ﬁrms. Then, a discriminated buyer may replace its initially accepted
contract with the more favourable oﬀer. We ﬁnd:
Proposition 5. The disadvantaged downstream ﬁrm will not claim its rival’s contract,
even if given this option after the inital round of contracting.
Indeed, this replicates McAfee and Schwartz (1994)’s ﬁnding even though contracts
are aﬀected by the regulatory option. To see the intuition, note that two-part tariﬀs are
employed: By the per-unit price, the supplier determines a downstream ﬁrm’s competi-
tiveness and, accordingly, its revenues. By the ﬁxed fee, it shifts these revenues towards
itself. Now, given discrimination against S1, suppose S1 claims its rival’s contract terms:
It then obtains S2’s lower per-unit price together with its ﬁxed fee. Due to the lower per-
unit price, downstream competition becomes more intense. This eﬀectively makes S2’s
tariﬀ less valuable. Yet, with the original ﬁxed fee - presuming the higher revenues under
price discrimination - S1 would incur a loss instead of obtaining additional proﬁts if it
claimed the same tariﬀ than S2. We therefore conclude that making best terms available
cannot serve to mitigate price discrimination in input markets.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we regarded a monopolistic bottleneck with an upstream supplier and two
symmetric downstream ﬁrms which sequentially interact with the supplier. We examined
how the regulatory threat of prescribing input supply at a linear price aﬀects the market
outcome, as it permits input market price discrimination. We found that actual outcomes
vary with input production cost and the regulated price. Indeed, if both production cost
and the optional price are rather low, no price discrimination arises. Most importantly,
the regulatory option induces input prices which lead to higher consumer surplus and
welfare than a ﬂat ban on price discrimination.
10Therefore, optional linear input prices seem to be a welfare enhancing alternative to
banning price discrimination per se. It complies with the presently adopted attitude of
European policy claiming a more economic approach to Article 82 TEC and explicitly
considers a dynamic market context. Note that outcomes vary with production cost and
non-discriminatory supply contracts arise if cost as well as the regulated price are rela-
tively low. This suggests to consider production cost when regarding price discrimination.
On a related note, one might consider downstream ﬁrms’ incentive to engage in prod-
uct diﬀerentiation in order to mitigate price discrimination. Referring to the example of
network industries and a situation where downstream ﬁrms solely resell a network owner’s
product, in particular, this suggests to look at vertically diﬀerentiated entry and down-
stream activity of vertically integrated ﬁrms. A full analysis of this issue is left to further
research.
116 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 and 2:
No exclusion:
If both downstream ﬁrms are active, maximising (1), given p = 1 − xi − xj with i = 1,2,
yields the ﬁrst-order-conditions
1 − 2xi − x
∗
j − ai = 0. (9)







(1 − 2ai + aj),





(1 + a1 + a2). (10)
Note that (3) implies that both downstream ﬁrms pursue market activity if and only if
2a2 − 1 < a1 < (1 + a2)/2.
















(−1 + 2a1 − 4a2 + 3c) ≤ 0 and
1
9
(−1 + 2a1 − 4a2 + 3c)a2 = 0






4(−1 + 2a1 + 3c) if a1 > 1
2 − 3
2c










4(1 − c)2 − 1




9(1 + a1)2 − 1




12S1’s contract is determined analogously to S2’s. First, consider the participation constraint

















(−1 + 15c + 12∆ − 14a1) ≤ 0 and
1
18
(−1 + 15c + 12∆ − 14a1)a1 = 0





(−1 + 7c + 4∆ − 4a1) ≤ 0 and
1
9
(−1 + 7c + 4∆ − 4a1)a1 = 0



















to distinguish diﬀerent equilibrium types and note that ∆I ≥ 0 only if c ≤ 1/7..6 Then







0 if ∆ ≤ ∆I
1
4(−1 + 7c + 4∆) if ∆I < ∆ ≤   ∆
1










9(a − c − ∆)(c + ∆) if ∆ ≤ ∆I
1
36(−1 + 3c)(−5 + 11c + 3∆) if ∆I < ∆ ≤   ∆
− 1
441(11 − 11c − 20∆)(−1 + c − 2∆) if   ∆ < ∆ ≤ ∆II.
(16)







0 if ∆ ≤ ∆I
0 if ∆I < ∆ ≤   ∆
1
7(−2 + 9c + 3∆) if   ∆ < ∆ ≤ ∆II
(17)









9(1 − c − ∆)(c + ∆) if ∆ ≤ ∆I
1
3(1 + c)(c + ∆) if ∆I < ∆ ≤   ∆
4
441(−1 + c − 2∆)(−17 + 17c + 8∆) if   ∆ < ∆ ≤ ∆II.
(18)
It is now easily verifed that a∗
1 ≥ a∗
2 for all ∆ ≤ ∆II. Analogously, F2 ≥ F1 follows.
Exclusion:
Let us now presume that one of the downstream ﬁrms is excluded. Then, the remaining
ﬁrm maximises its proﬁts according to the ﬁrst-order condition
1 − 2xi − ai = 0.














Fi = πi(ai) − πi(a
R). (21)
Solving this problem results in
am






















for i,j = 1,2 and i  = j.
q.e.d
Addendum to Proposition 1 and 2:
Let us now look at thresholds ∆I and   ∆. Indeed, ∆ ≤ ∆I deﬁnes the value range ∆ at
14which both ﬁrms are oﬀered zero per-unit prices. By (15) this requires
1
4





≡ ∆I < ∆II.
Further, in case of exclusion, both ﬁrms can always claim their outside option aR. Due
to (25) exclusion eﬀectively occurs iﬀ aR ≥ 1+c





Finally, in order to exactly specify a2, we check a∗
2 ≤ 0. This requires
1
7





− 3c ≡   ∆.
Yet, if c ≤ 15, then   ∆ > ∆II, therefore, a∗
2 ≤ 0 holds iﬀ
∆ ≤ min
 
∆II,   ∆
 
≡   ∆.
Proof of Corollary 1:
Corollary 1 directly follows from Proposition 1 and 2.
Proof of Proposition 3:
Welfare in our setup is, generally, given by




2 − p(x1 + x2) (26)





First, let us restate welfare with respect to per-unit input prices a1 and a2. Given that
both ﬁrms are active in the downstream industry, we can use (3) to rewrite aggregate




(2 − a1 + a2).








(2 − a1 − a2)
2 . (28)










(2 − ai − aj) (29)
with i,j = 1,2 and i  = j. In the following, we will argue that, if both S1 and S2 are
active in the market,
∂W/∂ai < 0
so that a higher input price ai always reduces welfare and only the lowest input prices
can induce maximal surplus for i = 1,2:
We ﬁrst consider the equilibrium contracts as computed for Proposition 1 and 2. With our
results in Proposition 1 and 2, the least upper bound of one ﬁrm i’s input price is given
by supai = c for i = 1,2. Moreover, we found that no exclusion requires ai < (1 + aj)/2
for i,j = 1,2 and i  = j. Therefore, the rival’s input price is bound by supaj = (1 + c)/2
from above for j = 1,2 and i  = j. The least upper bound of the sum of input prices is
then given by

















since 0 < c < 1. We therefore conclude that the lowest per-unit prices a1 and a2 maximise
welfare, in case both downstream ﬁrms participate in market activity.
Now let us consider the case of one ﬁrm’s exclusion with total demand xm = (1 − c)/2
compared to aggregate demand X∗ in case both ﬁrms are active: We ﬁnd X∗ ≥ xm by
inserting (13) and (15) into (3). Further, according to (27) welfare increases in aggregate
demand at xm, i.e. ∂W(xm,c)/∂X > 0 at this point. Moreover, if both downstream ﬁrms
are active, welfare is maximised by lowest per-unit input prices. Thus, it remains to see
that the lowest a1 and a2 occur for c ≤ 1/7 if ∆ ≤ ∆I and for c > 1/7 if ∆ = 0.
q.e.d
16Proof of Proposition 4:
As before, downstream competition is described by (1) to (3). Uniform pricing as de-




























Proof of Proposition 5:
Let us assume that - contrary to Proposition 5 - S1 claims S2’s more favorable contract if





























































17By Proposition 1, a∗
2 < a∗
























is true. It immediately follows that S1 will never claim its rival’s contract terms when
both downstream ﬁrms participate in the market activity.
To complete the proof, let us now consider the case of exclusion. Suppose, ﬁrm Si is
excluded, but claims its rival’s contract terms (am
j ,F m





j ) − F
m
j > 0 (33)











(1 − (c + ∆))
2 > 0. (34)
Since exclusion occurs only if ∆ > ∆II, an upper bound on the third term of the LHS is
given by (1 − c)2/16. Hence, the disadvantaged ﬁrm Si would claim its rival’s contract













Yet, this condition is never satisﬁed. We therefore conclude that (33) and (34) never
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